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HOW BEST TO CONFRONT THE BULLY: SHOULD TITLE IX OR ANTI-
BULLYING STATUTES BE THE ANSWER? 
SUSAN HANLEY KOSSE* 
AND ROBERT H. WRIGHT** 
Where, after all, do universal human rights begin? In small places, close to home—so 
close and so small that they cannot be seen on any maps of the world. Yet they are the 
world of the individual person; the neighborhood he lives in; the school or college she at-
tends; the factory, farm, or office where he works. Such are the places where every man, 
woman, and child seeks equal justice, equal opportunity, equal dignity without dis-
crimination. Unless these rights have meaning there, they have little meaning anywhere. 
Without concerted citizen action to uphold them close to home, we shall look in vain for 
progress in the larger world.1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
This article examines liability for peer-on-peer sexual harassment in the 
context of bullying under Title IX and state anti-bullying laws.  Part II describes 
the persistent problem of bullying in school and its extremely harmful effects on 
students.  Part III explores the background of Title IX and the evolving law     
regarding peer-on-peer harassment. Part IV proceeds to summarize state anti-
bullying laws, while Part V analyzes which legal approach, Title IX or anti-
bullying statutes, is best to protect children from peer-on-peer sexual harass-
ment at school.  The article then argues that both Title IX and anti-bullying stat-
utes are necessary to protect our children because Title IX does not cover those 
forms of harassment that do not fit the definition of sexual harassment or are not 
of adequate severity.  Despite the importance of anti-bullying statutes, many 
currently existing statutes are flawed because they are too deferential to local 
schools.  The article concludes by offering practical suggestions to legislatures 
when drafting anti-bullying statutes. 
 
 * Susan Hanley Kosse is an Associate Professor of Law at the Louis D. Brandeis School of 
Law, University of Louisville, J.D., University of Louisville School of Law, 1991; B.A., Miami Univer-
sity, 1987. 
 ** Robert H. Wright is a LL.M. candidate, Franklin Pierce Law Center, 2005; J.D., University of 
Louisville School of Law, 2003; B.A. Centre College, 2000.  
 1. Stan Davis, Stop Bullying Now!, at http://www.stopbullyingnow.com (last visited Jan. 12, 
2005) (quoting Eleanor Roosevelt, The Great Question (1958)). 
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II.  BULLYING IN THE SCHOOLS 
There is another kind of violence, and that is violence by talking.  It can leave you hurt-
ing more than a cut with a knife.  It can leave you bruised inside.2 
Bullying, one form of student-on-student harassment, is a major problem 
for schools today.  Although an exact definition of bullying is difficult to ascer-
tain, bullying in this article means “when one child or group of children repeat-
edly picks on another child—often one who is seen as weaker and more vulner-
able.”3  Bullying can involve many types of behaviors, including “physical 
violence and attacks,” “verbal taunts,” “name-calling and put-downs,” “threats 
and intimidation,” “extortion or stealing of money and possessions,” and       
“exclusion from the peer group.”4  Bullying usually begins in elementary school, 
peaks in middle school, and diminishes, but does not disappear, in high school.5  
“Boys and girls usually bully same sex classmates, with female bullying taking 
an indirect, manipulative form.”6 
Often dismissed as just teasing or fighting, many individuals are unaware 
of how pervasive the problem of bullying is in schools, even though research 
shows that eighty percent of adolescents report being bullied during their school 
years and ninety percent of fourth through eighth graders report being victims 
of bullying.7  If these facts were not alarming enough, statistics estimate that a 
child is bullied every seven minutes.8  Bullying often occurs at schools in areas 
where there is minimal or no supervision.9  Students are frustrated that teachers 
or other adults in the classroom ignore bullying incidents.10  Students uniformly 
express the desire that teachers intervene rather than ignore teasing and bully-
ing.11 
Although bullying has existed since the dawn of time, advances in technol-
ogy are making it easier for bullies to engage in harmful behavior.  Web pages 
designed by students to criticize, stigmatize and traumatize their classmates are 
becoming more and more common.  For example, a website called 
www.SchoolRumors.com “offered virtual scrawlings on a bathroom wall, and in 
two weeks it let 67,000 students into that bathroom for a peek.  The stuff was 
 
 2. NAT’L ASS’N OF ATT’YS GENERAL, BRUISED INSIDE: WHAT OUR CHILDREN SAY ABOUT YOUTH 
VIOLENCE, WHAT CAUSES IT AND WHAT WE SHOULD DO ABOUT IT 5 (Apr. 2000), 
http://www.atg.wa.gov/pubs/bruised_inside041000.pdf. 
 3. WASH. STATE OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN. ET AL., BULLYING IT’S NOT OKAY (distinguishing 
bullying from fighting and teasing because it involves the bully controlling the victim), 
http://www.atg.wa.gov/bullying/BullyingBrochure8_05.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2005). 
 4. MARLIES SUDERMANN ET AL, BULLYING: INFORMATION FOR PARENTS AND TEACHERS (1996), 
http://www.lfcc.on.ca/bully.htm. 
 5. WASH. STATE ATT’Y GEN.’S TASK FORCE, PROTECTING OUR CHILDREN 5 (Jan. 2001), 
http://www.atg.wa.gov/pubs/Protecting_Our_Children013001.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2005). 
 6. Id. at 6. 
 7. Id. at 5. 
 8. ATRIUM SOCIETY, BULLYING STATISTICS, at http://www.atriumsoc.org/pages/bullying 
statistics.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2005). 
 9. WASH. STATE ATT’Y GEN.’S TASK FORCE, supra note 5, at 5. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
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scurrilous and vicious, cyberspace blood sport.  One girl was reportedly ready 
to kill herself because of what was said about her.”12 
Unfortunately, this girl’s reaction is not atypical.  In fact, bullying is often 
seen as a common link between school violence, suicide and homicide.13  Homi-
cide perpetrators are more than twice as likely as homicide victims to have been 
bullied by peers.14  Besides suicide and homicide, other harmful victim             
responses include staying home from school, changing schools to feel safe, and 
avoiding school bathrooms and other places at school for fear of being harassed 
or assaulted.15  The long term effects of bullying can be devastating, including 
depression and low self-esteem.16 
A. Sexual Harassment 
Peer-on-peer sexual harassment, one form of bullying, has equally alarm-
ing statistics.  Estimates from a 1993 study indicate that of the 1,600 public high 
school students polled, eighty-five percent of the girls and seventy-six percent of 
the boys reported experiencing some sort of sexual harassment.17  The harass-
ment may take many forms, from unwanted touching to minor insults or teas-
ing.18  Types of sexual harassment students experience in school include sexual 
comments, jokes, gestures or looks, being touched, grabbed, or pinched in a sex-
ual way, sexual rumors spread about them, clothing pulled off or down, or even 
being forced to engage in sexual behavior other than kissing.19 
Although peer-on-peer sexual harassment is much more explicit and con-
cerning, victims’ responses to this type of harassment mirror the responses to 
other types of bullying.  The victims of peer-on-peer sexual harassment do not 
want to attend school, do not want to talk as much in class, and find it harder to 
pay attention in class.  In addition, some children reported thinking about 
changing schools.20 
B. Sexual Harassment of Homosexual Students 
In Dylan N.’s case, verbal harassment escalated almost immediately into physi-
cal violence.  Other students began spitting on him and throwing food at him.  
One day in the parking lot outside his school, six students surrounded him and 
threw a lasso around his neck, saying, “Let’s tie the faggot to the back of the 
truck.”  After that incident, the harassment and violence intensified.  “I was liv-
 
 12. Pat Morrison, Behind the Tragedy, the Despair of an Outcast, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2001, at B1. 
The site was shut down days before Andy Williams killed students at Santana High School in South-
ern California. 
 13. ATRIUM SOCIETY, supra note 8. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Up to seven percent of eighth graders stay home at least once a month because of bullying. 
WASH. STATE ATT’Y GEN.’S TASK FORCE, supra note 5, at 5. 
 16. SUDERMANN ET AL., supra note 4. 
 17. AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. WOMEN, HOSTILE HALLWAYS: THE AAUW SURVEY ON SEXUAL 
HARASSMENT IN AMERICA’S SCHOOLS 7 (1993). 
 18. Id. at 9. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
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ing in the disciplinary office because other harassment was going on.  Everyone 
knew,” he said.  “It gave permission for a whole new level of physical stuff to 
occur.”  He was pushed up against lockers by students who shouted “fag” and 
“bitch” at him.  On one occasion, a group of students surrounded him outside 
the school, punching him and jeering while security officers stood nearby.  
When the assault ended, he had a split lip and a broken nose and was bleeding 
profusely from his ear.21 
As Dylan N.’s story suggests, sexual harassment and bullying of homosex-
ual students is a major problem in schools.  Human Rights Watch, an interna-
tional research and advocacy group, released a report that documented the seri-
ousness of the problem.22 According to this report, nearly every homosexual 
student interviewed experienced constant verbal and non-physical abuse.       
Besides name calling, these students were subject to written notes, obscene or 
suggestive cartoons, graffiti scrawled on walls or lockers, or pornography.  It 
was not uncommon for these behaviors to escalate fairly quickly from mere ver-
bal taunts to unwelcome sexual contact or even physical violence.23  Gay, lesbian, 
bisexual and transgender students reported having difficulty concentrating in 
school and fearing for their safety, and some students actually changed schools 
or dropped out altogether.24 
The results of a 2003 survey by the Gay, Lesbian and Straight Education 
Network echo the findings of Human Rights Watch.25  This report found that 
eighty-four percent of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (“LGBT”) students 
reported being verbally harassed in the past school year because of their sexual 
orientation.26  More than ninety percent of LGBT students reported regularly 
hearing homophobic comments at school27 and, most shockingly, eighty-five 
percent of LGBT students reported that when faculty or staff heard homophobic 
remarks, they never intervened or intervened only some of the time.28  In addi-
tion to the verbal abuse, nearly forty percent of these students reported being 
physically harassed in the past school year because of their sexual orientation.29 
The research discussed in this Part does not even begin to take into account 
the detrimental effects for children who are bystanders of this bullying.  The sta-
tistics paint a bleak picture of the safety and well-being of today’s students, 
whether they are bully, victim, or bystander.  The United States and many other 
governments have taken notice of the statistics.  On March 1, 2004, Health and 
Human Services Secretary Tommy G. Thompson announced a new campaign, 
 
 21. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, HATRED IN THE HALLWAYS, http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/ 
uslgbt/Final-06a.html (1999). 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. See JOSEPH G. KOSCIW, GAY, LESBIAN AND STRAIGHT EDUCATION NETWORK,  THE 2003 
NATIONAL SCHOOL CLIMATE SURVEY, http://www.glsen.org/binary-data/GLSEN_ 
ATTACHMENTS/file/300-3.PDF (2004) [hereinafter GLSEN]. 
 26. Id. at 15. 
 27. Id. at 5. 
 28. Id. at 6. 
 29. Id. at 15. 
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“Take A Stand. Lend A Hand. Stop Bullying Now!” designed to educate more 
Americans about how to stop bullying and youth violence.30  The campaign 
includes a Web-based, animated story featuring a cast of young people who deal 
with bullies in the classrooms, hallways, and grounds of a middle school.  With 
help from teachers, parents, and other adults, the bullied characters get support 
from fellow students who step up to make it clear that bullying is ‘not cool’.31 
In addition to the web page, which is updated every two weeks, the campaign 
has radio public service announcements and resource kits for helping create bul-
lying prevention programs.32  Although it is hoped that the campaign will be   
effective in educating citizens about the problem, it can only be viewed as part 
of a solution; both anti-bullying statutes and Title IX are necessary if the prob-
lem of bullying is to be effectively remedied. 
III.  TITLE IX LIABILITY FOR PEER-ON-PEER SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
A. Background to Title IX 
Title IX was passed in 1972 largely to help women gain access to the same 
educational opportunities as their male counterparts.33  Congress debated 
whether Title IX was actually needed or instead, if Congress could just add the 
word “sex” to Title VII which prohibited racial discrimination.34  Title IX’s pro-
ponents, however, were ultimately victorious and Title IX was passed providing 
that, “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded 
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination 
under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assis-
tance . . . .”35 
At the time of its passage, there was uncertainty about whether Title IX was 
intended to cover sexual harassment.36  In fact, not until the 1990s did the Su-
preme Court hear cases pertaining to sexual harassment and Title IX.  One of the 
first of these cases, Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District, involved       
alleged sexual harassment of an eighth grader by her teacher.37  The student 
claimed that the teacher made sexually suggestive comments to her and other 
female students.38  The teacher also fondled Gebser’s breasts and ultimately    
engaged in sexual intercourse with her.39 
 
 30. News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Services, HHS Launches Campaign to Pre-
vent Youth Bullying, http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2004pres/20040301.html (Mar. 1, 2004). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. See Kelly Titus, Students, Beware: Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District, 60 LA. L. 
REV. 321, 327 (1999). 
 34. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 663 (1999); 20 U.S.C. § 681 et seq. (Supp. 
1999) (although TitleVII prohibited sexual discrimination, educational facilities were exempted). 
 35. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2005). 
 36. Davis, 526 U.S. at 663. 
 37. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist. 524 U.S. 274 (1998). 
 38. Id. at 277-78. 
 39. Id. at 278. 
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The Court in Gebser set out a two part standard for holding schools liable 
under Title IX.40  First, a school official with authority to address the problem 
must have actual knowledge of the harassment.41  Second, the official must fail to 
respond adequately.42  This is a fairly difficult standard for the plaintiff to satisfy, 
since it does not require that the school actually stop the harassment; appar-
ently, an adequate response does not go that far.  Furthermore, liability is estab-
lished only if the official acts with “deliberate indifference” or an official deci-
sion not to correct the violation.43  In Gebser, the school officials knew about the 
teacher’s sexually inappropriate comments to the female students and warned 
him to watch his classroom comments, but because the school did not have ac-
tual knowledge of the teacher’s sexual acts with Gebser, the Court refused to 
find the school liable under Title IX for sexual harassment.44 
B. Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education 
In 1999, the Supreme Court decided Davis, a case involving Title IX and 
sexual harassment issues.45  Instead of teacher-on-student sexual harassment, the 
sexual harassment in Davis was peer-on-peer.46  The plaintiff sued the school dis-
trict, not for the other student’s actions, but for its own inaction, by allowing the 
known harassment to continue against her.47  During the school year of 1999, 
Davis, a fifth grade girl, endured continual verbal and physical harassment by 
one of her classmates.  Davis was subjected to her fellow classmate rubbing 
against her genital areas and breasts, as well as, constant verbal comments to her 
such as “I want to feel your boobs” and “I want to get in bed with you.”48  Even 
though the girl’s mother complained to the school, nothing was ever done to 
stop the harassment.49  It only stopped when the fellow classmate was charged 
with sexual battery.50 
The Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit’s holding that schools could not be 
liable for peer-on-peer harassment, holding instead that a recipient of federal 
funds could be liable “for deliberate indifference to known acts of harassment.”51  
The Court held that in order to be liable under Title IX, “[t]he recipient itself 
must ‘exclude [persons] from participation in . . . den[y] [persons] the benefits 
of, or . . . subjec[t] [persons] to discrimination under  ‘its ‘program[s] or ac-
tivit[ies]’.”52  In remanding the case to the district court for further proceedings, 
 
 40. Id. at 292. 
 41. Id. at 288. 
 42. Id. at 290. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 278, 291. 
 45. Davis, 526 U.S. at 633. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 634. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 633. 
 52. Id. at 640-41. 
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the Court found that the school might have created a hostile environment for the 
plaintiff in failing to take disciplinary actions against the student.53 
After determining that a private remedy was available under Title IX for 
peer-on-peer harassment, the Court defined sex discrimination in the same fash-
ion as it had done in Title VII.54  Prior Title VII cases included sexual harassment 
as a form of sex discrimination.55  Under Title VII, employers can be liable for 
both quid pro quo sexual harassment and hostile environment sexual harass-
ment.56  Adopting this approach for Title IX, the Court concluded that a school 
district could be liable for hostile environment sexual harassment when the stu-
dent’s behavior is so “severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive” as to deprive 
the victim of the educational opportunities provided by the school.57  Unlike   Ti-
tle VII, which uses agency principles, liability only attaches if the school has ac-
tual knowledge of the harassment and acts with deliberate indifference.58 
Just what constitutes “severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive” has 
been the subject of many debates.  Justice Kennedy’s dissent in Davis anticipated 
that such a nebulous standard would result in widespread problems for 
schools.59  The Office of Civil Rights (OCR) publishes a guide to aid schools in 
determining their responsibilities for peer-on-peer sexual harassment.60  That 
guide says, “[I]t is the totality of the circumstances in which the behavior occurs 
that is critical in determining whether a hostile environment exists.”61  Among 
the factors that should be considered are: the degree to which the conduct       
affected one or more students’ education; the type, frequency, and duration of 
the conduct; the identity of and relationship between the alleged harasser and 
the subject or subjects of the harassment; the number of individuals involved; 
the age and sex of the alleged harasser and the subject or subjects of the harass-
ment; the size of the school, location of the incidents, and context in which they 
occurred; and other incidents at the school.62  These guidelines, although helpful, 
illustrate the problem schools and courts face with Title IX lawsuits.  The facts 
must be examined on a case-by-case basis.  What may qualify as a hostile envi-
ronment at one school may not be actionable at another.  Unfortunately, it is im-
possible for a bright line test to be developed in this area of law. 
 
 53. Id. at 649. 
 54. Id. at 636. 
 55. See, e.g., Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986). 
 56. Id. at 65-66.  Quid pro quo sexual harassment is defined as “advances or requests for sexual 
favors in return for advancements or other employment decisions, and ‘hostile environment’ in-
volves an environment that interferes with performance.”  Titus, supra note 33, at 324-25. 
 57. Davis, 526 U.S. at 650. 
 58. Id. at 643. 
 59. Id. at 654-86 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  Justice Kennedy, Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice 
Scalia and Justice Thomas comprised the dissent.  “The majority’s opinion purports to be narrow, 
but the limiting principles it proposes are illusory.  The fence the Court has built is made of little 
sticks, and it cannot contain the avalanche of liability now set in motion.” Id. at 657. 
 60. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, REVISED SEXUAL HARASSMENT GUIDANCE: 
HARASSMENT OF STUDENTS BY SCHOOL EMPLOYEES, OTHER STUDENTS, OR THIRD PARTIES (Jan. 2001), 
http://www.ed.gov/offices/OCR/archives/pdf/shguide.pdf. 
 61. Id. at 7. 
 62. Id. at 6-7. 
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C. Cases since Davis 
Since Davis, courts have had the opportunity to decide the level of conduct 
necessary to satisfy the severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive standard, the 
actual notice requirement, and the deliberate indifference of the school require-
ment.63  Although plaintiffs have been successful in bringing peer-on-peer har-
assment claims under Title IX, victories occur only in the most egregious cir-
cumstances.  Since the Davis standard is so high, courts have been reluctant to 
rule in favor of students.  As a result, critics contend that Davis has not provided 
a vehicle to curtail sexual harassment in the schools, but instead, “has been the 
glue that has held the . . . status quo of general indifference in place.”64 
Although a detailed examination of all the post-Davis cases is beyond the 
scope of this article, an example of a situation that meets the high standard of 
Davis is found in Vance v. Spencer County Public School District.65  Vance involved 
harassment that began on Alma McGowen’s second day of school.66  The har-
assment first started with peers verbally abusing her, calling her “the gay girl,” 
“whore” and other more offensive labels.67  This behavior escalated and male 
students engaged in harassing Alma and other female students by continually 
hitting them, snapping their bras, and grabbing their butts.68  This behavior of 
her classmates appeared mild, however, when compared to the day several stu-
dents backed her up against a wall and held her hands and pulled her hair while 
they tried to yank off her shirt.69  Finally a boy intervened to help Alma even as 
another boy was taking his pants off in order to have sex with her.70  Alma’s 
mother complained to the school about these horrible incidents, as well as many 
other incidents of inappropriate touching.71  Despite Alma’s and her mother’s 
well-documented concerns spanning four school years, the school took no action 
to address these specific harassment allegations.72 
The Sixth Circuit had little difficulty affirming the trial court’s denial of 
summary judgment for the Board of Education.73  Alma was able to show her 
harassment was severe, pervasive and offensive because she had endured       
numerous incidents of verbal and physical sexual harassment.74  In addition, 
 
 63. See P.H. v. Sch. Dist. of Kansas City, 265 F.3d 653 (8th Cir. 2001); Vance v. Spencer County 
Pub. Sch. Dist., 231 F.3d 253 (6th Cir. 2000); Reese v. Jefferson Sch. Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d 736 (9th 
Cir. 2000); Wills v. Brown Univ., 184 F.3d 20 (1st Cir. 1999); Adusumilli v. Ill. Inst. of Tech., No. 98-
3561, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 17954 (7th Cir. July 21, 1999); Murrell v. Sch. Dist No. 1, Denver, Colo., 
186 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 1999). 
 64. Gigi Rollini, Note & Comment, Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education: A Hollow Vic-
tory for Student Victims of Peer Sexual Harassment, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 987, 995 (2003). 
 65. See Vance, 231 F.3d. at 259; See also Murrell, 186 F.3d at 1247 (reversing the lower court’s 
dismissal of the student’s Title IX cause of action). 
 66. Vance, 231 F.3d. at 256. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 256-258. 
 73. The jury awarded Alma $220,000.  Id. at 258. 
 74. Id. at 259. 
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Alma and her mother’s repeated verbal and written complaints to her teachers 
and principal satisfied the notice requirement.75  Finally, the school acted with 
deliberate indifference because the school’s response was “clearly unreasonable 
in light of the known circumstances.”76  Acknowledging that no particular       
response was required, the circuit court focused on the school’s lack of any      
response or ineffective response to the various complaints.77  The court was par-
ticularly disturbed by the school’s lack of action when Alma was stabbed in the 
hand with a pen and when the students tried to rip off her shirt, as well as by 
the lack of an investigation following the filing of a detailed complaint with the 
Title IX coordinator.78  Looking at these and the many other incidents, the Sixth 
Circuit affirmed the district court’s order denying the Board’s Rule 50 motion.79 
In contrast, most other circuits have refused to find for the plaintiff because 
the conduct did not qualify as severe or pervasive, the plaintiff failed to show 
actual notice was given, or the school was not deliberately indifferent.80  For    
example, the Seventh Circuit in Adusumilli v. Illinois Institute of Technology        
refused to find two incidents of inappropriate touching (one on the shoulder 
and one on the breast) severe.81  In actuality, there were twelve incidents of har-
assment but the court refused to consider them since only two were actually   
reported.82 
Even when the harassment is severe, the circuits have been hesitant to     
impose liability.  For example, in Sopher v. Hoben, the school successfully          
defended a suit because school administrators did not react with deliberate     
indifference upon learning of a special education student’s rape and inappropri-
ate touching.83  The school contacted legal authorities, installed a window in the 
room, offered the plaintiff increased supervision and an escort and created 
counseling sessions on how to relate to members of the opposite sex.84  The 
Court stated that these actions were not “clearly unreasonable in light of the 
known circumstances.”85  Arguing the possibility that the school did, indeed, act 
 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 260. 
 77. Id. at 262. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 264. 
 80. See Gabrielle M. v. Park Forest-Chicago Heights, Ill. Sch. Dist. 163, 315 F.3d 817 (7th Cir. 
2003) (concluding school district did not act unreasonably and plaintiff was not denied access to 
educational opportunities); Hawkins v. Sarasota Co. Sch. Bd, 322 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2003); Reese v. 
Jefferson Sch. Dist. No. 14J, 208 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2000) (concluding school district was not deliber-
ately indifferent); Johnson v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 47, 194 F. Supp. 2d 939 (D. Minn. 2002); Burwell v. 
Pekin Comm. High Sch. Dist. 303, 213 F. Supp. 2d 917 (C.D. Ill. 2002); Benefield v. Bd. of Tr. of Univ. 
of Ala., 214 F. Supp. 2d 1212 (N. D. Ala. 2002); Wilson v. Beaumont Indep. Sch. Dist., 144 F. Supp. 2d 
690 (E.D. Tex. 2001); Clark v. Bibb County Bd. of Educ., 174 F. Supp. 2d 1369 (M.D. Ga. 2001); C.R.K. 
v. U.S.D. 260, 176 F. Supp. 2d 1145 (D. Kan. 2001); Manfredi v. Mt. Vernon Bd. of Educ., 94. F. Supp. 
2d 447 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).  For an excellent discussion of all these cases see Diane Heckman, Tracing the 
History of Peer Sexual Harassment in Title IX Cases, 183 EDUC. L. REP. 1 (2004). 
 81. 191 F.3d 455, 1999 WL 528169 (7th  Cir. 1999). 
 82. Id. 
 83. 195 F.3d 845, 855 (6th Cir. 1999). 
 84. Id. at 849-50. 
 85. Id. at 855. 
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with deliberate indifference, the dissent takes note that the rape was not a lone 
incident and that the mother had complained before about inappropriate sexual 
advances on her daughter and her not wanting her daughter to be left alone 
with certain boys.86 
IV.  AN OVERVIEW OF STATE ANTI-BULLYING LEGISLATION 
In an attempt to provide students with a safer, more secure learning envi-
ronment, many states have begun passing legislation aimed at deterring bully-
ing.87  The manner and degree in which these laws address the problem, how-
ever, vary greatly from state to state.  Indeed, state anti-bullying laws differ in 
several ways; most notably in how each defines “bullying,” facilitates the report-
ing of bullying, and enumerates the consequences of bullying.  While nearly 
every state anti-bullying law currently enacted includes the three aforemen-
tioned elements, a few go even further in attempting to address the problem of 
school bullying by requiring or encouraging local school boards to adopt         
affirmative measures aimed at addressing bullying before it actually happens.88 
A. The Definition of “Bullying” 
Of those states with anti-bullying laws currently in effect, only a few actu-
ally provide an explicit definition of the term “bullying.”89  Most often, this task 
is left entirely within the discretion of the local school board.90  For those anti-
bullying laws which do define the term, however, the types of conduct prohib-
ited under each definition vary greatly.  Some states, like Arkansas and New 
Hampshire, define the term broadly as any conduct rising to the level of “pupil 
harassment.”91  Most states, however, are much more specific in regards to the 
type of harassing conduct that constitute “bullying” within the meaning of their 
anti-bullying law.  These states define the term based upon either the intent of 
 
 86. Id. at 857. 
 87. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-514 (Michie 2004); COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-32-109.1 (1998); CONN. 
GEN. STAT. § 10-222d (2002); GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-145 (Harrison 1989); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
17:416.13 (West 2004); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN..§ 193-F:3 (1999); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-15 (1999 
West); 708 OKLA. ST. ANN. tit. 24 § 100.4 (West 1997); OR. REV. STAT. § 339.356 (2003); R.I. GEN. LAWS 
§ 16-21-26 (2001); WASH. REV. CODE § 28A:300.285 (1997); W. VA. CODE § 18-2C-3 et seq. (2004).  For 
states with laws intended to create a safer learning environment for students, but not addressing 
bullying specifically, see CAL. EDUC. CODE § 32282 (Deering 2002); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10-20.14 
(1998); M.N.A. 1A.03(2); MISS. CODE ANN. § 37-11-54 (1999); NEV. REV. STAT. 388.139 (2002); VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 16 § 165 (2002). 
 88. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-32-109.1(2)(a)(X) (1998) (requiring schools to enact  “a spe-
cific policy concerning bullying prevention and education”); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:415.17(C)(2) 
(West 2004) (encouraging schools to “develop and offer youth development and assistance programs 
that employ violence prevention and intervention initiatives for students in kindergarten and the 
elementary grades”). 
 89. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-514 (Michie 2004); COL. REV. STAT. § 22-32-109 (1998); CONN. 
GEN. STAT. § 10-222d (2002); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:416.13 (West 2004); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN..§ 
193-F:3 (1999); N.J.STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-15 (West 1999); OR. REV. STAT. § 339.356 (2003); R.I. GEN. 
LAWS § 16-21-26 (2001); WASH. REV. CODE § 28A:300.285 (1997). 
 90. GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-145 (2004); W. VA. CODE § 18-2C-3 et seq. (2004). 
 91. ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-514(a) (Michie 2004); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193-F:3 (1999). 
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the perpetrator, the reasonableness of his actions, or the effect that it has on     
another student. 
The vast majority of those states that provide a definition of “bullying” for 
adoption by local school boards in their anti-bullying policies define the term 
according to the intent of the perpetrator.  In Colorado, “bullying” includes “any 
written or verbal expression, or physical act or gesture, or a pattern thereof, 
which is intended to cause distress upon one or more students in the school, on 
school grounds, in school vehicles, at a designated bus stop, or at school activi-
ties or sanctioned events.”92  A similar definition has been adopted by the Con-
necticut legislature in its anti-bullying law; defining the term as “any overt act 
by a student or a group of students directed against another student with the   
intent to ridicule, humiliate or intimidate the other student while on school 
grounds or at a school-sponsored activity which acts are repeated against the 
same student over time.”93 
Other “intent-states,” however, are even more specific in articulating the 
type of harassment meant to be prohibited under their anti-bullying law.  In 
Louisiana, for example, “bullying” is defined as: 
any intentional gesture or written, verbal, or physical act that: (a) a reasonable 
person under the circumstances should know would have the effect of harming 
a student or damaging his property or placing a student in reasonable fear of 
harm to his life or person or damage to his property; and (b) is so severe, persis-
tent, or pervasive that it creates an intimidating, threatening, or abusive educa-
tional environment for a student.94 
A similar definition has been adopted by Rhode Island which in its anti-bullying 
law defines the term to include: 
intentional  written, verbal or physical act or threat of a physical act that, under 
the totality of the circumstances: (i) a reasonable person should know will have 
the effect of: physically harming a student, damaging a student’s property, plac-
ing a student in reasonable fear of harm to his or her person, or placing a stu-
dent in reasonable fear of damage to his or her property; or (ii) is sufficiently se-
vere, persistent, or pervasive that it creates an intimidating, threatening or 
abusive educational environment for a student.95 
Washington, too, has enacted a similar definition of bullying.  Under its anti-
bullying law, “bullying” includes: 
any intentional written, verbal, or physical act [which] (a) physically harms a 
student or damages the student’s property; or (b) has the effect of substantially 
interfering with a student’s education; or (c) is so severe, persistent, or pervasive 
that it creates an intimidating or threatening educational environment; or (d) has 
the effect of substantially disrupting the orderly operation of the school96 
 
 92. COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-32-109.1(2)(a)(X) (1998). 
 93. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-222d (2002). 
 94. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:416.13(B)(2) (West 2004). 
 95. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-21-26(a)(2) (2001). 
 96. WASH. REV. CODE § 28A:300.285(2) (1997). 
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In New Jersey and Oregon, however, “bullying’ is not defined according to 
the intent of the perpetrator, but rather according to the perception of his actions 
to others and the effect which his actions have on others.  That is, under the New 
Jersey statute: 
any gesture or written, verbal or physical act that is reasonably perceived as    
being motivated either by any actual or perceived characteristic, such as race, 
color, religion, ancestry, national origin, gender, sexual orientation, gender iden-
tity and expression, or a mental physical or sensory handicap, or by any other 
distinguishing characteristic that takes place on school property, at any school-
sponsored function or on a school bus that a reasonable person should know, 
under the circumstances, will have the effect of harming a student or damaging 
the student’s property, or placing a student in reasonable fear of harm to his 
person or damage to his property; or has the effect of insulting or demeaning 
any student or group of students in such a way as to cause substantial disrup-
tion in, or substantial interference with, the orderly operation of the school.97 
Oregon’s anti-bullying statute considers neither the intent of the alleged bully 
nor how his actions are perceived by others.  Instead, that statute considers     
exclusively the effect that the bully’s conduct has on other students; defining 
“bullying” as: 
any act that substantially interferes with a student’s educational benefits, oppor-
tunities or performance, that takes place on or immediately adjacent to school 
grounds, at any school-sponsored activity, on school-provided transportation or 
at any official school bus stop, and that has the effect of: (1) physically harming a 
student or damaging a student’s property; (2) knowingly placing a student in 
reasonable fear of physical harm to the student or damage to the student’s prop-
erty; or (3) creating a hostile educational environment.98 
B. Differences in How Bullying is Reported 
Just as states differ in how they define “bullying” within the meaning of 
their anti-bullying law, so too do they differ in the way in which school officials 
are to be notified of specific incidents of bullying.  Some states place a statutory 
duty on school employees to report such incidents.99  Others merely encourage 
employees to do so by providing them with immunity from any cause of action 
arising from their failure to report.100  In addition, a few states require local 
school boards to develop a method by which students can anonymously report 
incidents of bullying to school officials so that they may be acted upon accord-
ingly.101 
 
 97. N.J.STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-15(b) (West 1999). 
 98. OR. REV. STAT. § 339.356(1) (2003). 
 99. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-514 (Michie 2004); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-222d (2002); N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 193-F:3 (1999); N.J.STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-15 (West 1999). 
 100. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:416.13 (West 2004); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-21-26 (2001); WASH. 
REV. CODE § 28A:300.285 (1997); W. VA. CODE § 18-2C-3 et seq. (2004). 
 101. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-222d (2002); N.J.STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-15 (West 1999); OR. REV. 
STAT. § 339.356 (2003); W. VA. CODE § 18-2C-3 et seq. (2004). 
080305 KOSSE.DOC 11/11/2005  9:16 AM 
 HOW BEST TO CONFRONT THE BULLY 65 
Only a few states actually require a school employee who witnesses an act 
of bullying to report it to a principal or other designated school official.102        
Arkansas’ anti-bullying law requires “that a school employee who has wit-
nessed or has reliable information that a pupil has been a victim of bullying as 
defined by the district shall report the incident to the principal.”103  This           
approach is typical of those anti-bullying laws which place an affirmative duty 
on school employees to report acts of bullying.  Connecticut has a similar provi-
sion in its anti-bullying law “requir[ing] school teachers and other school staff 
who witness acts of bullying or receive student reports of bullying to be notified 
by school administrators.”104  New Hampshire’s anti-bullying law also includes a 
reporting requirement which requires school employees to “report . . . inci-
dent[s] to the principal, or other designated school official, who in turn shall    
report the incident to the superintendent.”105  New Jersey’s anti-bullying law, 
while not actually requiring reporting itself, does require the local school board 
to adopt “a procedure for reporting an act of harassment, intimidation or bully-
ing, including a provision that permits a person to report an act of harassment, 
intimidation or bullying anonymously.”106 
Other anti-bullying laws encourage employees to report incidents of bully-
ing by providing immunity from any liability which might later arise from an 
employee’s failure to report the act.107  Louisiana’s anti-bullying law, for exam-
ple, encourages reporting by rewarding those employees who in good faith    
report incidents with “immun[ity] from a right of action for damages arising 
from any failure to remedy the reported incident.”108  Similarly, West Virginia’s 
anti-bullying law provides school employees with immunity from a cause of   
action for damages arising from reporting [an incident of bullying],109 so long as 
the employee does so in good faith to the appropriate school official, and in 
compliance with the applicable procedure.110  Other states, however, do not    
expressly require that a school employee reporting an incident of bullying do so 
in good faith.  Oregon’s anti-bullying law, for example, grants school employees 
“immun[ity] from a cause of action for damages arising from any failure to rem-
edy the reported act.”111 Similarly, Washington’s anti-bullying law provides im-
munity “from a right of action for damages arising from any failure to remedy 
the reported incident,”112 and Rhode Island’s anti-bullying law provides that 
 
 102. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-514 (Michie 2004); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-222d (2002); N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 193-F:3 (1999); N.J.STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-15 (West 1999). 
 103. ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-514(a)(4) (Michie 2004). 
 104. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-222d (2002). 
 105. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193 F-3(II) (1999). 
 106. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-15(a)(5) (West 1999). 
 107. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:416.13 (West 2004); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-21-26 (2001); WASH. 
REV. CODE § 28A:300.285 (1997); W. VA. CODE § 18-2C-3 et seq. (2004). 
 108. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:416.13(B)(3) (West 2004). 
 109. W. VA. CODE § 18-2C-4 (2004). 
 110. See id. 
 111. OR. REV. STAT. § 339.362(3) (2003). 
 112. WASH. REV. CODE § 28A.600.480(3) (1997). 
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school employees who report acts of bullying “promptly”113 are “not liable for 
damages arising from any failure to remedy the reported incident.”114 
In addition to requiring or encouraging school employees to report acts of 
bullying, a few states’ anti-bullying laws also require local school districts to 
create a way for students to anonymously report acts of bullying.115  New Jer-
sey’s anti-bullying law requires that local school districts enact a policy which 
contains, among other things, “a procedure for reporting an act of harassment, 
intimidation or bullying, including a provision that permits a person to report 
an act of harassment, intimidation or bullying anonymously . . . “116  Connecti-
cut’s anti-bullying law goes even further, requiring school districts to formulate 
a policy which both allows students to anonymously reports acts of bullying 
and “enable[s] the parents or guardians of students to file written reports of 
suspected bullying.”117 
C. Consequences of Bullying 
No current state anti-bullying law creates a private cause of action for bul-
lying.  Indeed, most anti-bullying laws leave the consequences for committing 
such an act entirely within the discretion of the local school board.118  Three 
states, however, do provide local school boards with some guidance on how to 
handle incidents of bullying.  Colorado’s anti-bullying law provides that while 
the consequences for an act of bullying are within the discretion of the local 
school district, any such punishment “shall include a reasonable balance          
between the pattern and the severity of such bullying behavior.”119  Although it 
does not fix a remedy itself, Connecticut’s anti-bullying law “require[s] the par-
ents or guardians of students who commit any verified acts of bullying and the 
guardians of students against whom such acts were directed to be noti-
fied . . . .”120 
West Virginia’s anti-bullying law, however, is by far the most extensive in 
regard to the consequences for committing an act of bullying.  That is, not only 
does West Virginia’s anti-bullying law require “a disciplinary procedure for any 
student guilty of harassment, intimidation or bullying,”121 but also the formula-
 
 113. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 16-21-26(h) (2001). 
 114. Id. 
 115. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-222d (2002); N.J.STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-15(b)(5) (West 1999); OR. 
REV. STAT. § 339.356(2)(e) (2003); W. VA. CODE § 18-2C-3(2004). For states with laws intended to cre-
ate a safer learning environment for student, but not addressing bullying specifically, see CAL. EDUC. 
CODE § 32282(a)(2) (Deering 2002); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 1A.03(2) (West 2004);); NEV. REV. STAT. 
388.132 (2002); 
 116. N.J.STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-15(b)(5) (West 1999). 
 117. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-222d (2002). 
 118. See, e.g.,  ARK. CODE ANN. § 6-18-514(e)(2) (Michie 2004); COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-109.1 (1998); 
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-222d (2002); N.J.STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-15 (West 1996); OR. REV. STAT. § 339.356 
(2003). 
 119. COLO. REV. STAT. § 22-32-109.1(2)(a)(X) (1998). 
 120. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 10-222d(7) (2002). 
 121. W. VA. CODE § 18-2C-4(9) (2004). 
080305 KOSSE.DOC 11/11/2005  9:16 AM 
 HOW BEST TO CONFRONT THE BULLY 67 
tion of “a strategy for protecting a victim from additional harassment, intimida-
tion or bullying, and from retaliation following a report.”122 
D. More Affirmative Measures 
Every state anti-bullying law addressed in this section seeks to discourage 
bullying in order to create a safer, more secure learning environment for stu-
dents.  Most of these laws seek to achieve this end by requiring local school 
boards to have a procedure which addresses bullying after an incident has      
already occurred.  Yet, a few states require or encourage local school boards to 
take affirmative measures in order to stop acts of bullying before they can ever 
occur.  Louisiana’s anti-bullying law, for example, enables schools to “develop 
and offer youth development and assistance programs that employ violence 
prevention and intervention initiatives for students in kindergarten and the 
elementary grades.”123 
Similarly, New Jersey schools are encouraged “to establish bullying pre-
vention programs, and other initiatives involving school staff, students, admin-
istrators, volunteers, parents, law enforcement and community members.”124  In 
order to facilitate such programs, the New Jersey statute requires school districts 
to “(1) provide training on the school district’s harassment, intimidation or bul-
lying policies to school employees and volunteers who have significant contact 
with students; and (2) develop a process for discussing the district’s harassment, 
intimidation or bullying policy with students” to the extent that funds are avail-
able for these purposes.125  Furthermore, “[i]nformation regarding the school dis-
trict policy [against bullying] shall be incorporated into a school employee train-
ing program.”126 
Oklahoma has also chosen to affirmatively address the problem of bullying 
by requiring each public school to form a “Safe School Committee.”127  Com-
posed of at least six members of the school community, this committee advises 
the principal as to: 
 
 122. Id.  § 18-2C-4(8) (2004). 
 123. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:416.17(C)(2) (2004).  Pursuant to LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
17:416.17(C), 
[s]uch programs may include but shall not be limited to the following components: (a) 
Provisions of services for students including behavioral training and intervention tech-
niques that promote cooperation and enhance interpersonal and conflict resolution skills, 
peer mediation, anger management, bullying prevention, life skills training, mentoring, 
counseling, and tutoring programs that improve academic achievement; (b)(i) Provisions 
of services which support the parents of students identified with behavioral needs that 
may need intervention or support.  Such parent services may include literacy services or 
parental training.  (b)(ii) Required participation of any parent of a student so identified in 
such intervention at the school or other designated facility.  (c) Collaboration with com-
munity-based organizations, including but not limited to youth services, civil, social ser-
vices, mental health, volunteer services, and juvenile agencies. 
Id. § 17:416.17(C). 
 124. N.J.STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-17(b) (West 1999). 
 125. Id. § 18A:37-17(b). 
 126. Id. § 18A:37-17(c). 
 127. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 24-100.5(A) (West 1997). 
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(1) unsafe conditions, possible strategies for students to avoid harm at school, 
student victimization, crime prevention, school violence, and other issues which 
prohibit the maintenance of a safe school; (2) student harassment, intimidation, 
and bullying at school; (3) professional development needs of faculty and staff 
to implement methods to decrease student harassment, intimidation, and bully-
ing; and (4) methods to encourage the involvement of the community and stu-
dents, the development of individual relationships between students and school 
staff, and use of problem-solving teams that include counselors and/or school 
psychologists.128 
In doing so, Section 24-100.5 requires the committee to “review traditional and 
accepted harassment, intimidation, and bullying prevention programs utilized 
by other states, state agencies, or school districts.”129 
Oregon, too, encourages school districts to “form harassment, intimidation 
or bullying prevention task forces, programs, and other initiatives involving 
school employees, students, administrators, volunteers, parents, guardians, law 
enforcement and community representatives.130 
Finally, West Virginia encourages but does not require “schools and county 
boards . . . to form bullying prevention task forces, programs and other initia-
tives involving school staff, students, teachers, administrators, parents, law     
enforcement and community members.”131  In addition to these program, West 
Virginia law also requires, “to the extent state and federal funds are appropri-
ated for [such] purposes,”132 that each school district: 
(1) Provide training on the harassment, intimidation or bullying policy to school 
employees and volunteers who have direct contact with students; and (2)       
Develop a process for educating students on the harassment, intimidation or 
bullying policy; and (3) Information regarding the county board policy against 
harassment, intimidation, or bullying shall be incorporated into each school’s 
current employee training program.133 
V.  ANALYSIS 
Although Title IX is a helpful tool in the eradication of harassment in 
schools, it is not enough.  Title IX does not require schools to adopt written poli-
cies prohibiting sexual harassment, it applies only to the most severe and egre-
gious forms of harassment, and it is debatable whether it applies to sexual orien-
tation harassment.  Nonetheless, states can close this gap by passing laws that 
require schools to specifically define the types of harassment prohibited as well 
as to outline the reporting, drafting, investigation and discipline procedures.  
Because such laws would necessarily involve some curtailment of the hateful, 
offensive speech that so often accompanies bullying, legislatures must be mind-
ful of the First Amendment when drafting these laws.  Of course, even though 
 
 128. Id. § 24-100.5(B) (1997). 
 129. Id. 
 130. OR. REV. STAT. § 339.359 (2003). 
 131. W. VA. CODE § 18-2C-5(a) (2004). 
 132. Id. § 18-2C-5(b) (2004). 
 133. Id. 
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such laws may limit free speech, many commentators have questioned and criti-
cized this rigid adherence to the First Amendment.134  The better approach 
would be to adopt a balancing test that weighs the value of speech against the 
harm it produces.135  Under this pragmatic approach, anti-bullying statutes will 
not run afoul of the Constitution because harassing speech is of very little or no 
value which is outweighed by the devastating harm it produces. 
A. Title IX Is Not Adequate by Itself to Protect Students from Harassment 
Because Title IX does not require schools to adopt specific written policies 
prohibiting sexual harassment, it is absolutely vital that state anti-bullying stat-
utes be bolstered and used.136  Requiring schools to adopt, disseminate and     en-
force strict anti-bullying policies will deter harassment incidents and serve as a 
clear indicator that the school will not tolerate or condone harassment. Experts 
contend that bullying can be reduced by up to fifty percent if a school-wide 
commitment to end bullying is adopted.137  Part of that approach involves form-
ing clear rules and strong social norms against bullying.138  This premise is also 
supported by GLSEN, which found a relationship between student safety, 
school attendance and safe schools laws. Among the several key findings is that 
LGBT students who did not have (or did not know of) a policy protecting them 
from violence and harassment were forty percent more likely to report skipping 
school out of fear for their personal safety.139  Yet despite their proven effective-




 David Feldman, Content Neutrality, in IMPORTING THE FIRST AMENDMENT 140, 146 (Ian Loveland 
ed., 1998). 
 135. See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS & NAT’L ASS’N OF ATT’YS GEN., 
PROTECTING STUDENTS FROM HARASSMENT AND HATE CRIME 27 (Jan. 1999), 
http://www.ed.gov/offices/OCR/archives/Harassment/index.html 
 136. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC.., supra note 135, provides that Title IX requires a recipient of Federal 
funds to notify students and parents of elementary and secondary students of its policy against dis-
crimination based on sex and have in place a prompt and equitable procedure for resolving sex dis-
crimination complaints. Sexual harassment can be a form of sexual discrimination. The Guidance 
clearly states that, while a recipient’s policy and procedure must meet all procedural requirements of 
Title IX and apply to sexual harassment, a school does not have to have a policy and procedure spe-
cifically     addressing sexual harassment, as long as its non-discrimination policy and procedures for 
handling discrimination complaints are effective in eliminating all types of sex discrimination. The 
Office for Civil Rights has found that policies and procedures specifically designed to address sexual 
harassment, if age appropriate, are a very effective means of making students and employees aware 
of what constitutes sexual harassment, that that conduct is prohibited sex discrimination, and that it 
will not be tolerated by the school. That awareness, in turn, can be a key element in preventing sex-
ual harassment. 
 137. Nels Ericson, Addressing the Problem of Juvenile Bullying, Dep’t of Justice, Office of Juvenile 
Justice and Delinquency Prevention Fact Sheet 27 (June, 2001), available at http://www.ncjrs.org/ 
pdffiles1/ojjdp/fs200126.pdf 
 138. Id. 
 139. GLSEN, supra note 25. 
 140. See Press Release, Dave Horn, Assistant Attorney General of Washington State, Myths and 
Facts About the Bullying / Safe Schools Bill  (Feb. 5, 2002), at http://www.safeschoolscoalition.org/ 
bully_summary2-5-02.pdf. 
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In addition, anti-bullying legislation is needed to provide remedies for the 
types of harassment that are beyond the scope of Title IX, because Title IX will 
only provide a remedy if the sexual harassment is sufficiently severe, persistent 
or pervasive to affect a student’s ability to participate in or benefit from an edu-
cational program.  Often sexual harassment will not rise to this extreme level, 
yet this behavior should not be tolerated in our nation’s schools.  The anti-
bullying policies should therefore not be limited to only the most severe inci-
dents.  Instead, they should prohibit any harassment that has the purpose or ef-
fect of substantially or unreasonably interfering with an individual’s academic 
performance or adversely affecting an individual’s learning opportunities.     
Additionally, state anti-bullying policies should not define hostile environments 
in the same way that federal courts do,141 but instead should broaden them to in-
clude situations even where no tangible harm is suffered by the student. 
This type of broader definition will also help to prohibit sexual and non-
sexual behavior directed at a student because of the student’s sexual orientation, 
which may not fit within Title IX’s definition of sexual harassment.  Because the 
Supreme Court has not officially ruled that discrimination based on sexual ori-
entation fits within Title VII or Title IX’s protections, a major gap possibly exists 
for plaintiffs suffering from this common type of harassment.  For example, 
heckling comments made to students because of their sexual orientation, such as 
“gay students are not welcome here,” do not constitute sexual harassment under 
Title IX.142  There is no good reason why such behavior should be overlooked in 
schools. 
Indeed, lower courts are making headway in this realm.  Despite originally 
holding that Title VII did not protect against sexual orientation discrimination, 
lower courts recently appear to interpret Title VII as now encompassing dis-
crimination based on sexual orientation.143  For example, in Rene v. MGM Grand 
Hotel, Inc.,144 the Ninth Circuit sitting en banc reversed the lower court and a di-
vided Ninth Circuit panel’s ruling that a homosexual male could not bring suit 
under Title VII to recover for the verbal and physical harassment he suffered 
from his co-workers.145  Plaintiffs have successfully used various theories to sup-
port their Title VII cases including the Sex-Specific Harassment Theory, the Sex-
Stereotyping Theory and the Disparate Impact Theory.146  However there are still 
many Circuits that refuse to allow Title VII protection for sexual orientation dis-
crimination.147 
 
 141. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 652. 
 142. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS & NAT’L ASS’N OF ATT’YS GEN., supra note 135, 
at 18. 
 143. See  DeSantis v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that there was no 
protection under Title VII for sexual orientation discrimination). 
 144. 305 F.3d 1061 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 145. Id. at 1064. 
 146. For a discussion of these theories and summaries of the cases, see Matthew Clark, Note, 
Stating A Title VII Claim For Sexual Orientation Discrimination in the Workplace: The Legal Theories Avail-
able After Rene v. MGM Grand Hotel, 51 UCLA  L. REV. 313 (2003). 
 147. See e.g. Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir. 1999); Wright-
son v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc., 99 F.3d 138, 143 (4th Cir. 1996); Williamson v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, 
Inc., 876 F.2d 69, 70 (8th Cir. 1989). 
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The courts have viewed Title IX in the same manner.  For example, the 
Northern District of California, relying on the Title VII cases for guidance,       
allowed a suit to proceed holding that harassment due to the victim’s perceived 
homosexuality can constitute “sexual harassment” within the meaning of Title 
IX.148  At the same time, however, a Minnesota federal district court dismissed a 
plaintiff’s Title IX claims based on discrimination due to his sexual orientation 
or perceived sexual orientation.149  Until the Supreme Court speaks directly on 
this issue or Congress amends Title IX to include sexual orientation, anti-
bullying statutes are necessary to cover these gaps. 
B. Necessary Components for an Effective Anti-Bullying Statute 
To be effective state legislatures should require school district policies to 
include the following components: (1) a general statement of the policy that a 
school district values a learning and working environment that is free from any 
type of violence and harassment; (2) consistent statewide definitions of the types 
of violence and harassment prohibited; (3) specific reporting procedures; (4) 
specific investigation procedures; (5) consistent range of school district actions; 
(6) reprisal provision prohibiting retaliation; (7) a statement that policy does not 
prohibit other procedures available or required under law; (8) provisions         
describing how the policy will be disseminated and employees and students 
trained; (9) penalty provisions for schools that fail to adopt or enforce anti-
bullying policies; (10) requirement that policies be submitted for review to the 
State’s Department of Education 
Unfortunately, many anti-bullying statutes do not require all of these com-
ponents, and, as a whole, they are too deferential to the decision-making powers 
of local school authorities.  The way in which most of these laws define “bully-
ing” is a good example.  Although a few of the anti-bullying laws discussed in 
Part V of this article give meaning to the term themselves, most leave this task 
entirely within the discretion of local school districts.  As such, it is possible that 
the type of conduct punishable as “bullying” within one school district might 
not constitute a punishable offense in another district within the same state.  
Such an incongruous approach to defining the very conduct that an anti-
bullying law seeks to address does nothing but confuse the purpose of such leg-
islation.  Ultimately, then, the great deference now afforded to local school dis-
tricts in defining “bullying” only serves to undermine any effectiveness that the 
state’s anti-bullying law might otherwise have. 
At a minimum, the statutes should require the anti-harassment policies to 
prohibit harassment based on the victim’s actual or perceived race, gender, sex-
ual orientation, gender identity, ethnicity, or disability.  By including religion 
and sexual orientation, these policies will be broader than the prohibitions 
 
 148. Ray v. Antioch Unified Sch. Dist., 107 F. Supp. 2d 1165, 1171 (N.D. Cal. 2000).  See also Doe v. 
Perry Cmty. Sch. Dist., 316 F. Supp. 2d 809, 834 (S.D. Iowa 2004). 
 149. Montgomery v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 709, 109 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1092 (D. Minn. 2000).  The 
court did hold, however, that Title IX would support a claim of harassment based on the perception 
that plaintiff did not fit his peers’ stereotypes of masculinity.  
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found in federal statutes.150  The statute itself should define these various types 
of harassment.  The definition should make clear that harassment is not limited 
to oral conduct but may include written, graphic and physical conduct relating 
to each category.  The statute should encourage districts to provide examples of 
harassing behavior for each category.151  In addition, the statute should require 
that all policies prohibit harassment during all academic programs and extra-
curricular activities even if occurring outside of school. 
Just as many state anti-bullying laws afford too much deference to local 
school districts in defining “bullying,” these laws also allow local authorities too 
much leeway in fashioning a remedy for violations of a school’s anti-bullying 
policy.  Here again, many of the laws discussed in Part V of this article are silent 
as to what type of recourse should be levied against a student found to be in vio-
lation of a school’s anti-bullying policy.  Even those states that do provide for 
some form of recourse do so only generally, leaving the specifics of such a pun-
ishment entirely within the discretion of the local school district.  Thus, it is 
likely that the punishment for bullying in one school district might substantially 
vary from that in another district within the same state.  Such a result is simply 
not fair to either the victims or perpetrators of bullying.  Although the authors 
can appreciate that the appropriate punishment should largely depend on the 
specifics of the incident, at a minimum, all policies should indicate the same 
range of distinct penalties and actions a school will employ to combat bullying 
and specific examples of when each should be used.  An anti-bullying statute 
should require policies to make clear that appropriate responses to bullying    
incidents may include counseling, warning, suspension, exclusion, expulsion, 
remediation, termination or discharge.  In addition, bullying will be reported to 
law enforcement and/or governmental and nongovernmental agencies that   
 
 150. Of those laws considered in Part IV of this article, only New Jersey’s statute has defined 
bullying as an act of harassment motivated by another’s religion or sexual orientation.  Furthermore, 
only California, Minnesota and New Jersey have protections for both sexual orientation and gender 
identity.  Only 5 other states, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin, 
have protection for sexual orientation. GAY, LESBIAN AND STRAIGHT EDUCATION NETWORK, STATE OF 
THE STATES 2004 2 (2004), available at http://www.glsen.org/cgi-bin/iowa/educator/library/ 
record/1687.html. 
 151. For example, the Arizona Sample School Policy Prohibiting Harassment and Violence pro-
vides the following examples of sexual harassment: (1) sexual advances; (2) touching, patting, grab-
bing or pinching another person’s intimate parts, whether that person is of the same sex or the oppo-
site sex; (3) coercing or forcing or attempting to coerce or force the touching of anyone’s intimate 
parts; (4) coercing, forcing or attempting to coerce or force sexual intercourse or a sexual act on an-
other; (5) graffiti of a sexual nature; (6) sexual gestures; (7) sexual or dirty jokes; (8) touching oneself 
sexually or talking about one’s sexual activity in front of others; (9) spreading rumors about or rating 
other students as to sexual activity or performance; (10) unwelcome, sexually motivated or inappro-
priate patting, pinching or physical contact (This prohibition does not preclude legitimate, non 
physical conduct such as the use of necessary restraints to avoid physical harm to persons or prop-
erty, or conduct such as teacher’s consoling hug of a young student, or one student’s demonstration 
of a sport’s move requiring contact with another student.); (11) other unwelcome sexual behavior or 
words, including demands for sexual favors, when accompanied by implied or overt threats con-
cerning an individual’s educational status or implied or overt promises of preferential treatment. 
OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN. (Arizona), ARIZONA SAMPLE SCHOOL POLICY PROHIBITING HARASSMENT 
AND VIOLENCE, in OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS & NAT’L ASS’N OF ATT’YS GEN. supra note 135, app. A, at 
59. 
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address civil rights violations in schools in accordance with state and federal 
law regarding data or records privacy. 
The overall effectiveness of the laws discussed in Part V of this article 
would be greatly increased if less deference were afforded to local school dis-
tricts in the formulation and enforcement of such policies.  While great defer-
ence should normally be given to a matter of local concern such as a school dis-
trict policy, doing so in the context of anti-bullying breeds only uncertainty as to 
the type of conduct prohibited by the policy and what remedy exists for violat-
ing a state’s prohibition against bullying.  In order to enact truly effective anti-
bullying legislation, the state legislature, either directly or through the state 
board of education, should articulate a single standard against which to deter-
mine whether a particular act of harassment rises to the level of “bullying” pun-
ishable under the law.  Moreover, the state legislature, not the local school dis-
trict, should fashion a range of remedies appropriate for the age and for the 
offense of those found guilty of such forms of harassment.  Until these standards 
are brought into uniformity, the application of these laws will continue to be 
undermined by the inequities bred by such inconsistency. 
Harmonizing the potentially numerous standards and punishments for 
bullying within a single state is a start, but the effectiveness of anti-bullying 
policies as a whole might also be increased by requiring, rather than merely    
encouraging, school employees to report acts of bullying to a principal or other 
school official.  Much like Title IX liability, once a school official gets notice of 
the bullying, liability should attach if the school does nothing to protect the vic-
tim or if what it does is ineffective.  As they currently exist, most state anti-
bullying laws merely encourage school employees to report acts of bullying by 
relieving those doing so from any liability arising from the failure to report such 
conduct.  Although encouraging reporting through this means is a step in the 
right direction to making the halls of public schools safer for students, it does 
not go far enough.  Ideally, school employees should be required to report acts of 
bullying to school officials who in turn should have a statutory duty to investi-
gate the report and, if legitimate, take specific action to prevent the victim from 
suffering any further harassment.  In order to aid in this process, all anti-
bullying statutes should require policies to include detailed reporting and       
response mechanisms.  In addition, these various protocols should be well 
known to school officials.  In addressing harassment incidents, the U.S. Depart-
ment of Education recommends various procedures including encouraging stu-
dents and parents to notify the district when harassment occurs.152  The school 
should interview the victim and make required reports as well as advise the vic-
tim of all options.153  The school should also evaluate the victim’s request for con-
fidentiality and honor it if it can be done without limiting the school’s ability to 
remedy the harassment.154  Finally, the school needs to take prompt remedial ac-
tion appropriate to the offense and the age and identity of the parties while pro-
 
 152. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS & NAT’L ASS’N OF ATT’YS GEN. supra note 135, 
at 23. 
 153. Id. at 23-24. 
 154. Id. at 24 
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viding interim protection including separation of the parties, referrals to victim 
assistance sources, and enforcement of the policy’s anti-retaliation provisions.155 
Anti-bullying legislation would also be more effective if each school were 
required to disclose to the public the number of reported acts of bullying within 
the previous school year.  Doing so would help foster a safer school environ-
ment for students by forcing school officials to take reported acts of bullying   
seriously or else face the reputation of being characterized by members of the 
local community as an “unsafe” school.  If such a poor reputation were to persist 
for several years, surely many parents would either withdraw their child from 
enrollment in the school or otherwise enroll their child in another, safer school. 
The effectiveness of anti-bullying statutes as a whole also might be            
increased if penalties were imposed upon school districts that fail to draft or   
enforce an anti-bullying policy.  Even after the Vermont legislature had enacted 
its anti-bullying statute, for example, many schools ignored the law.156              
Although the language of many anti-bullying statutes is laudable, the purpose 
of these laws cannot be effectuated unless school districts and school boards are 
required to enforce the mandate of the state legislature that enacted the anti-
bullying statute.  The easiest way in which local school authorities might be 
made to do so is by imposing a penalty on those schools found not to be in com-
pliance with state law.  In the alternative, rewards in the way of financial incen-
tives, might be given to those schools with the most comprehensive anti-
bullying policy and the fewest amount of bullying incidents reported during a 
given school year.  Such measures clearly require the state to do more than sim-
ply pass an anti-bullying statute as a public relations measure.  If these statutes 
are to be effective, the state must be wholly committed to the enforcement of its 
anti-bullying statute and must evidence this commitment through the continu-
ous review of those policies actually adopted by local school boards.  
The greatest problem with state anti-bullying legislation, though, is the 
number of states that have remained silent on the issue despite an increased 
awareness of the ill effects bullying has on students both at home and at school.  
To date, thirty-three states have failed to address this issue through the enact-
ment of an anti-bullying statute.  Of these states, nearly one-half have consid-
ered such legislation.  Yet, these proposals, have either failed to make it out of 
committee or were voted down once they reached the house floor, at least in 
part because they sought to prohibit harassment based upon a student’s sexual 
orientation.  Most incidents of harassment, however, involve a student who is 
either homosexual or perceived as such by others.  Until the public comes to   
realize that bullying is fueled in large part by homophobia and that the gay and 
lesbian students need extra protection from bullies because of their sexual orien-
tation, harassment will continue to be a part of daily life for many students. 
 
 155. Id. 
 156. Daniel Greene, The Ballenger-Green Diversity Paper, “You’re So Gay!”: Anti-Gay Harassment 
in Vermont Public Schools, 27 VT. L. REV. 919, 940-41 (Summer, 2003).  
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C. Possible Pitfalls for Legislatures to Consider When Drafting Anti-Bullying 
Statutes 
When drafting anti-bullying statutes and policies, legislators and school 
administrators should be careful not to violate the First Amendment.  A recent 
case addressed the free speech and harassment issues in the context of an anti-
harassment policy passed by a school district in Pennsylvania.157  The Third Cir-
cuit held that a Pennsylvania public school district violated students’ First 
Amendment rights when the district adopted an anti-harassment policy.158  The 
policy sought to eliminate disrespectful behavior to help meet its goal of “pro-
viding all students with a safe, secure, and nurturing school environment.”159 
Harassment that was prohibited was defined as “[v]erbal or physical con-
duct based on one’s actual or perceived race, religion, color, national origin, 
gender, sexual orientation, disability, or other personal characteristics, and 
which has the purpose or effect of substantially interfering with a student’s edu-
cational performance or creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive environ-
ment.”160 
Prohibited conduct included: 
any unwelcome verbal, written or physical conduct which offends, denigrates or 
belittles an individual because of any characteristics described above, [includ-
ing] unsolicited derogatory remarks, jokes, demeaning comments or behaviors, 
slurs, mimicking, name calling, graffiti, innuendo, gestures, physical contact, 
stalking, threatening, bullying, extorting or the display or circulation of written 
materials or pictures.161 
Punishments for the harassment included “warning, exclusion, suspension,     
expulsion, transfer, termination, discharge . . . training, education, or counsel-
ing.”162 
A guardian of two public school students brought the lawsuit alleging the 
policy was unconstitutional on its face.163  The students, avowed Christians,    be-
lieved their religion required them to “speak out about the sinful nature and 
harmful effects of homosexuality.”164  The students requested that the Court   de-
clare the policy unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.165 
The federal district court dismissed the case holding that the policy was fa-
cially constitutional.166  The court read the policy as mirroring the standard al-
ready codified in Pennsylvania’s Human Relations Act, Title VI and Title IX.167  
The court read the first paragraph defining harassment as prohibiting “language 
 
 157. See Saxe v. State College Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 158. Id at 217. 
 159. Id. at 202. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 202–3. 
 162. Saxe, 240 F.3d at 203. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 203–04. 
 166. See Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 77 F. Supp. 2d 621 (M.D. Pa. 1999). 
 167. Id. at 626. 
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or conduct which is based on specified characteristics and which has the effect of 
‘substantially interfering with a student’s educational performance’ or which 
creates a hostile educational atmosphere.”168  This language is virtually the same 
standard used by Title IX and therefore does not prohibit anything that is not 
already illegal.169  The court also refused to accept the plaintiff’s vagueness      
argument, as defining harassment any more precisely may be impossible.170    Fi-
nally, the district court opined that the First Amendment did not protect har-
assment.171 
In reversing the district court, the Third Circuit refused to accept a “har-
assment exception” to the First Amendment.172  In addition, the harassment pol-
icy extended beyond the scope of the anti-discrimination laws.173  While Title VI 
and Title IX cover only discrimination based on sex, race, color, national origin, 
age and disability, the policy covered “other personal characteristics” such as 
“clothing,” “appearance,” “hobbies and values” and “social skills.”174 
Besides being too broad to survive constitutional scrutiny, the court held 
that the policy could not satisfy the tests the Supreme Court has provided to   
determine when student speech can be permissibly regulated.175  As the policy 
extended to non-vulgar, non-school sponsored speech, the proper test the court 
must use was set out in Tinker.176  The policy failed the Tinker test because it    in-
cluded speech that did not actually cause disruption but merely intended to do 
so.177  The court stated: 
[A]s Tinker made clear, the ‘undifferentiated fear or apprehension of distur-
bance’ is not enough to justify a restriction on student speech. Although [State 
College Area School District] correctly asserts that it has a compelling interest in 
promoting an educational environment that is safe and conducive to learning, it 
fails to provide any particularized reason as to why it anticipates substantial 
disruption from the broad swath of student speech prohibited under the pol-
icy.178 
D. Anti-Harassment Policies Do Not Violate the First Amendment 
Not surprisingly, critics of the Saxe opinion began voicing their disap-
proval.179  Some criticized the court’s reliance on Title VII and Title IX cases to 
 
 168. Id. at 625. 
 169. Id. at 626. 
 170. Id. at 625. 
 171. Saxe, 77 F. Supp. 2d at 627. 
 172. Saxe, 240 F.3d at 204. 
 173. Id. at 210–11. 
 174. Id. at 210. 
 175. Id. at 216–17; see also Killion v. Franklin Reg’l Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446, 459 (W.D. Pa. 
2001) (also holding that a school district’s policy was overbroad and vague). 
 176. See Saxe, 240 F.3d at 216. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. at 217. 
 179. See Thomas L. Henderson, From the ACBA: Life After Free Speech Ruling, 3 LAWYERS J. 4, 4 
(2001); Martha McCarthy, Anti-Harassment Policies In Public Schools: How Vulnerable Are They?, 31 J.L. 
& EDUC. 52 (2002). 
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support the conclusion that the policy was overbroad.180  They argued reliance 
on these cases was misplaced since those cases focus on the higher standard for 
finding a school or employer liable for failing to address peer-on-peer harass-
ment.  In contrast, the anti-harassment policies seek to control unacceptable stu-
dent behavior and schools have wide latitude to do this even if the behavior 
does not violate a federal or state law.181 
In addition, the court’s finding that the students’ freedom of expression 
was violated was criticized.182  The court should have followed prior precedent 
that makes clear student rights are not coextensive with those of adults and that 
a school has more authority to limit student rights.183  Unfortunately, the court 
chose to compare the policy to a hate speech ordinance without recognizing the 
distinction made for the treatment of expression rights in the school setting.184 
Although acknowledging the difficulty of classifying private expression 
that must be tolerated and offensive expression that can be regulated, Professor 
McCarthy urges courts reviewing harassment policies to remember that student 
speech that is lewd, indecent and disruptive is already allowed to be regu-
lated.185  Speech interferes with the education of students and is contrary to the 
educational goals and mission of the school can be regulated.186  McCarthy fails 
to see how harassing expression would not easily interfere with the school’s 
goals and mission and thinks it can therefore be regulated.187  Finally, she dis-
agrees that a showing of actual disruption is necessary before a school may con-
stitutionally regulate student expression.188 
Other commentaries, instead of questioning the decision itself, have tried to 
warn schools about possible pitfalls to avoid in light of the problems found with 
the policy in the Saxe case.189  For example, attorney Thomas L. Henderson      
advises schools to use consistent definitions of relevant terms and apply the pol-
icy only to conduct occurring at school or at a school-related activity.190  In addi-
tion, the policy should apply only to characteristics protected by federal law and 
proscribe only speech that is (a) lewd, vulgar or profane or that is (b) sufficiently 
severe or pervasive that it interferes with educational performance and is rea-
sonably believed to cause actual, material disruption.191 
 
 180. McCarthy, supra note 179, at 63. 
 181. Id. at 63-64. 
 182. Id. at 64. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. McCarthy, supra note 179, at 65. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at 66-67. 
 189. Henderson, supra at note 178, at 4. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
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E. Courts Need to Balance the Value of the Speech Against the Harm It Pro-
duces 
Although the above advice may be helpful to a school district, the real 
problem with Saxe and many cases dealing with the First Amendment in other 
settings is that judges allow the First Amendment “principles free reign without 
regard to the desirability or otherwise of the outcomes.”192  This seems to reso-
nate particularly loudly in a case of harassment, especially since Supreme Court 
jurisprudence supports the principle that not all speech forms enjoy the same 
level of protection from state interference.193 
People who believe that freedom of speech may sometimes have to give 
way to the protection of other freedoms do not see this principle as demeaning 
the right of free speech.  They would argue, as Feldman does, “a freedom which 
is exercised in a way which has anti-social consequences is less valuable, and 
when exercised in that way deserves less protection, than one which has no anti-
social consequences, or confers benefits on people.”194  To determine whether the 
right of free speech should prevail, he suggests weighing the range of social and 
individual interests the speech serves and how the rights contribute to those in-
terests.195  In the case of sexual harassment and bullying, allowing the harassing 
speech serves no social interest and only a limited individual interest, if any.  In 
addition, social scientists claim a causal connection exists between bullying and 
victims committing suicide and/or homicide.196  As a result, this type of situation 
is one in which the social harms from the speech justify the restraint on speech. 
Supporters of this position argue that the origins of the First Amendment 
itself require such an interpretation.  The basis for this argument centers on the 
belief that not all speech deserves the same protection.  They support a hierar-
chy in which political speech receives more protection than commercial or artis-
tic speech.197  This is consistent with the Founders’ goals in drafting the First 
Amendment, as Madison’s emphasis was on guaranteeing citizens the right to 
criticize and question the government.  As a result, many feel that political speech 
should be given the highest level of protection from governmental interference, 
whereas legislative regulation of harassing speech should be assessed under less 
rigorous scrutiny standards of a sort applied to commercial or artistic speech. 
Proponents of this view argue that this will not be contrary to existing case 
law.  The balancing approach and the view that the freedom of speech can be 
limited if it harms others can be found in very early American writings, includ-
 
 192. David Feldman, Content Neutrality, in IMPORTING THE FIRST AMENDMENT 140, 146 (Ian Love-
land ed., 1998). 
 193. Ian Cram, Beyond Madison?  The U.S. Supreme Court and the Regulation of Sexually Explicit Ex-
pression, 2002 PUBLIC LAW 743, 746. 
 194. Feldman, supra note 192, at 166-67. 
 195. Id. at 167. 
196 See generally Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Protection, OJJDP Fact Sheet (June 2001) 
at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffiles1/ojjdp/fs200127.pdf (last visited Apr. 19, 2005) and Atrium Soci-
ety, Bullying Statistics at http://www.atriumsoc.org/pages/bullyingstatistics.html (last visited Apr. 
19, 2005). 
 197. For a more in depth discussion see Cram, supra note 193, at 746. 
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ing Justice Story’s treatise on the constitution.198  For example, commentators  ar-
gue that a restriction on certain forms of pornography is comparable to the regu-
lations on false commercial speech which would cause harm.199  They argue that 
the “prevention of harm” justification is a sounder basis for supporting the por-
nography regulations than the “moral consensus” position based on contempo-
rary community standards.200  Why could this same analysis not apply to harass-
ing speech? 
Recently, however, the Supreme Court of the United States has steadily 
been moving away from using this categorization of high and low value speech 
approach to analyzing free speech claims.201  Instead of using a balancing test 
weighing the value of the speech against the harm it produces, the Court has 
preferred to analyze all content-based restrictions with strict scrutiny.202  The Jus-
tices do this even though the content being regulated could be classified as hav-
ing a lower value than political speech and thus deserving of less scrutiny.203  
This shift in the Supreme Court’s approach makes it more difficult for content 
regulations to survive a constitutional challenge. 
As the above analysis illustrates, the tension between these two counter-
vailing policies of protecting children from bullying and harassment and pro-
tecting individual rights is what makes no easy solution possible and what 
makes us uneasy with the Saxe decision.  The Third Circuit’s strict adherence to 
the free speech values may actually be damaging public order and the weakest 
members of our society. 
Others share our approach specifically when analyzing the interplay of the 
First Amendment and harassment.  In arguing that Title VII’s harassment law 
does not run afoul of the First Amendment, Professor Ruescher urges courts to 
take “a pragmatic approach to determining the constitutionality of laws that    
restrict low-value speech by assessing whether the legislature’s aim was to sup-
press a particular message, or, rather, to achieve a legitimate legislative goal.”204  
Using the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Virginia v. Black,205 he argues that 
any overbreadth problems can be resolved by requiring plaintiffs to prove the 
speaker’s intent was to harass.206  The court’s inquiry would focus on whether 
 
 198. John F. Wirenius, The Road to Brandenburg: A Look At The Evolving Understanding of the First 
Amendment, 43 DRAKE L. REV. 1, 4 (1994). 
 199. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 220 (1993). 
 200. Id. at 221. 
 201. For an excellent discussion of the Court’s recent approach, see Keith Werhan, The Liberaliza-
tion of Freedom of Speech on a Conservative Court, 80 IOWA L. REV. 51, 52-85 (1994). 
202
 W erhan, supra, note 200, at 85 
203
 Id. at 65-66 
 204. Robert Austin Ruescher, Saving Title VII: Using Intent to Distinguish Harassment From Expres-
sion, 23 REV. LITIG. 349, 352 (2004). See also Andrea Meryl Kirshenbaum, Hostile Environment Sexual 
Harassment Law and The First Amendment: Can The Two Peacefully Coexist?, 12 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 67, 
87-94 (2002, (suggesting five approaches courts can use to harmonize the First Amendment and hos-
tile environment sexual harassment law and providing a good summary of the literature concerning 
this heavily debated issue). 
 205. 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (finding a Virginia hate speech statute banning cross burnings was con-
stitutional as long as defendant’s intent to intimidate was proven). 
 206. Ruescher, supra note 204, at 352. 
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the speaker sought to harass or merely express an opinion.207  The speaker’s    in-
tent would be ascertained by using a totality of the circumstances analysis.208  
Because this would be such a significant burden on plaintiffs, Professor 
Ruescher suggests it only be required when “the speech, judged by its content, 
raises the possibility that the speaker was engaging in protected expression.”209  
This would not be the situation when the speech involved crude remarks or 
sexual propositions, because no expressive speech is implicated.210  Finally, he 
suggests that any underbreadth issue be resolved by determining what the goal 
of the policy is.  As long as anti-harassment policies are not “a ruse” to suppress 
free speech, they should be upheld.211 
This approach seems a sensible one when dealing with low value harassing 
speech in the schools.  To apply the First Amendment without weighing the 
harm the speech creates is to choose theory over reality.  Courts have been will-
ing to regulate commercial and artistic speech which arguably has a greater    
societal value than any speech used by the school bully.  Consequently, this    
demeaning, degrading and destroying speech should be labeled low value and 
not be subject to strict scrutiny by the courts. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Until more states enact anti-bullying legislation that has teeth and Congress 
amends Title IX to include sexual orientation harassment, bullying will continue 
to be viewed merely as an unfortunate consequence of childhood, despite        
research evidencing the far more extensive implications of such conduct.  As a 
civilized nation, we can no longer treat bullying as an inescapable part of child-
hood but must take a more active role in preventing it.  The authors do not mean 
to suggest that legislation is our only weapon against this crisis, but it can be a 
formidable weapon in our battle against the bully.  We urge Congress and state 
legislatures to have the courage to protect our children and amend Title IX and 
pass anti-bullying statutes, and we urge courts to have the wisdom to analyze 
these new statutes in a common sense manner. 
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